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Abstract
Why do some poor people engage in clientelism whereas others do not? Why does clientelism
sometimes take traditional forms and sometimes more instrumental forms? We propose a formal
model of clientelism that addresses these questions focusing primarily on the citizen’s perspective.
Citizens choose between supporting broad-based redistribution or engaging in clientelism.
Introducing insights from social psychology, we study the interactions between citizen beliefs and
values, and their political choices. Clientelism, political inefficacy, and inequality legitimation beliefs
reinforce each other leading to multiple equilibria. One of these resembles traditional clientelism,
with disempowered clients that legitimize social inequalities. Community connectivity breaks this
reinforcement mechanism and leads to another equilibrium where clientelism takes a modern,
instrumental, form. The model delivers insights on the role of citizen beliefs for their bargaining
power as well as for the persistence and transformation of clientelism. We illustrate the key
mechanisms with ethnographic literature on the topic.
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1. Introduction
The last few decades brought a wealth of new insights on the nature, mechanics,
and drivers of clientelism. We have learned a great deal about party strategies (e.g.,
whether to target swing or core voters) and the mechanics of the exchange (e.g., the
role of monitoring, reciprocity, and brokers). The literature made particular strides
in understanding vote-buying, which it has come to view often as synonymous with
clientelism.1 We have learned far less about why voters engage in clientelism. The
calculations of voters have remained relatively simplified, mostly involving a simple
trade-off between material benefits from clientelism and expressive benefits from
voting for a programmatic alternative. The key result is that poorer individuals
tend to sell their votes because their marginal utility of material benefits offered for
their votes is higher (see Dixit and Londregan, 1996; Stokes et al., 2013). Variation
in the poor’s engagement in clientelism is mostly explained as the result of differ-
ences in party targeting (e.g., Finan and Schechter, 2012; Gans-Morse et al., 2014;
Stokes, 2005)
The current emphasis on the supply side of the vote-buying variety of clientelism
has left two significant gaps in our understanding. First, the political choices of the
poor remain inadequately understood. Although clientelism indeed correlates with
poverty (Brusco et al., 2004; Justesen and Manzetti, 2017; Stokes et al., 2013) and
the mechanism in the literature explaining this correlation is compelling, poor indi-
viduals often purposefully establish political linkages other than clientelistic ones.
A relevant literature on demand for redistribution argues that the poor ought to
support political platforms promising income redistribution, precisely because their
low income implies that they stand to gain the most from it (Alesina and Giuliano,
2011; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Meltzer and Richard, 1981). The apparent
contradictory conclusions of these two strands of literature suggest that factors in
addition to income may matter for the poor’s political choices. Second, the focus
on vote-buying (or one-shot, material exchanges for votes) fails to shed light on the
variation in forms of clientelism. As evidenced by classical literature on the topic
(see the articles in Schmidt et al. (1977)), and increasingly acknowledged by current
research (e.g., Hilgers, 2009; Lawson and Greene, 2014; Nichter, 2014, 2018;
Pellicer et al., 2020), clientelism not only exists in its one-shot election-time instru-
mental form, but also in forms involving long-standing relations of insurance and
support. These ‘traditional’ or ‘relational’ forms of clientelism may include affec-
tive ties and are embedded in social norms and personal relationships. Importantly,
this type of clientelistic relationship is not a phenomenon of the past, but often still
forms the backbone of modern, machine-style clientelistic organizations at the local
level or organizes votes for candidates in the absence of such machines (Gottlieb,
2017; Lemarchand, 1972). Reaching a more complete understanding of clientelism
requires considering both forms of exchanges.
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Following these observations, this paper seeks to address two core questions.
First, what factors other than income drive the choice between clientelism and
redistribution? Second, under which circumstances do the poor engage in tradi-
tional forms of clientelism, socially embedded, hierarchical, personal, and long-
term, rather than in modern, essentially vote-buying, types?
We argue that broadening the theoretical framework of clientelism choice can
yield insights into the two questions posed here. We propose to broaden this focus
by integrating recent research from social psychology, and in particular on the
legitimation of inequality. Prominent theories in social psychology such as ‘belief
in a just world’ or ‘system justification’ argue that it can be psychologically adap-
tive in certain contexts to legitimize inequality (Jost et al., 2004; Lerner, 1982).
Social psychology work on collective action argues that inequality delegitimation is
one of the key psychological prerequisites of horizontal mobilization (Jost et al.,
2012; Van Zomeren et al., 2008)). These insights have already expanded our under-
standing of demand for redistribution beyond material determinants (Alesina and
Giuliano, 2011; Benabou and Tirole, 2006). Integrating inequality legitimation into
the study of clientelism can also help understanding why some poor people engage
in clientelism and others do not, and why some engage in traditional versus mod-
ern types of clientelism.
This article proposes a model that incorporates recent social psychology work
on inequality legitimation to the study of clientelism. The model has the following
key features. First, citizens choose whether to engage in clientelism or support a
redistributive platform. Second, citizens hold efficacy perceptions concerning the
chances of success of the redistributive platform, and perceptions on the legitimacy
of inequality. Third, efficacy perceptions and inequality legitimation values are
endogenously determined and interact with clientelism choices to generate different
types of equilibria.
The model delivers three equilibria. One equilibrium features a high degree of
inequality legitimation, low perceptions of efficacy, and widespread clientelism, the
characteristics of traditional clientelism. A second equilibrium features the oppo-
site characteristics, with the poor strongly condemning inequality and supporting
the redistributive platform.
The key mechanism generating these equilibria is the complementarity between
the extent of clientelism, perceptions of inefficacy, and legitimation of inequality.
Perceptions of inefficacy induce citizens to believe that inequality is inevitable; fac-
ing this prospect they adapt psychologically by legitimizing inequality. Legitimizing
inequality, in turn, leads them to better tolerate clientelism, leading to more cliente-
lism, more inefficacy, and even more inequality legitimation.
These complementarities, however, can break down when communities become
more informationally connected. This leads to a third equilibrium where clientelism
and support for redistribution co-exist. Crucially, inequality in this equilibrium is
not legitimized by the poor, in contrast to the traditional clientelism equilibrium.
Clientelistic exchanges in this form can be considered more instrumental from the
citizen’s perspective, corresponding to vote-buying or modern clientelism.
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The results of the model emphasize the role of clients and their beliefs for the
characteristics and dynamics of clientelism. First, the fact that clients in traditional
settings legitimize inequality decreases their bargaining power and leads them to get
a worse deal out of clientelism than in modern settings. Second, and related, the
legitimation of inequality in traditional clientelism also makes it resilient and stable,
requiring massive alterations of the environment in order for it to be eliminated.
However, both the legitimation of inequality and the traditional form of clientelism
that it supports can be gradually eroded. This can occur with increasing informa-
tional connectivity of the community, leading to a transformation of clientelism into
a modern type. We illustrate the model’s core insights with work from the ethno-
graphic literature.
Our insights complement existing work on the role of supply factors for the bar-
gaining power of clients (Corstange, 2018; Hilgers, 2009; Shami, 2012). We also
contribute to an ongoing debate about the factors driving the persistence and
decline of clientelism. So far, studies emphasize socio-economic or institutional fac-
tors and focus on the transformation of clientelistic into platform-driven, program-
matic, politics (Bustikova and Corduneanu-Huci, 2017; Kitschelt and Kselman,
2013; Stokes et al., 2013). Our paper considers a potential transformation of
traditional-style into electoral clientelism in addition to programmatic politics and
shows how client beliefs affects these pathways. Our focus on the agency of clients
and the important role clients play for the persistence of different types of cliente-
lism links with an important nascent body of work in political science that puts the
perspective of the citizen center stage (Kramon, 2016; Nichter, 2018; Nichter and
Peress, 2017).
More generally, our model adds to the important growing literature that empha-
sizes the endogenous determination of values and perceptions of citizens for under-
standing political choice and political outcomes (Acharya et al., 2018; Minozzi,
2013). In our model, it is precisely the feedbacks between political choices and per-
ceptions that drives our key insights on different types of clientelism. The psycholo-
gical complementarity that underlies our results, between inefficacy and inequality
legitimation, has received support in recent experimental work in social psychology
and economics (Johnson and Fujita, 2012; Kay and Friesen, 2011; Pellicer et al.,
2018; Van der Toorn et al., 2015).
The model also has important limitations. In particular, our aim to bring detail
to the political choices and perceptions of the poor leads us to make simplifying
assumptions which are needed to keep the model tractable. First, the model consid-
ers the supply side only in an extremely simplified way: we consider that there is a
patron that chooses the level of clientelistic transfers, but the choice of the patron
is modeled in the simplest possible way. The model does not consider politicians
competing in elections. This implies, among other things, that we do not consider
the credibility problems often addressed in clientelism models (Gallego, 2015;
Keefer and Vlaicu, 2008; Robinson and Verdier, 2013; Stokes, 2005). The model is
best thought of as representing informal political mobilization rather than formal
voting, i.e., a model about grassroots mobilization in the pursuit of broad-based
redistribution. Second, the model focuses particularly on poor individuals that
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stand to gain from redistribution; this implies that the model is best thought of as
describing a community with high levels of inequality where the overwhelming
majority of citizens are relatively poor. Third, the political choice we consider for
the poor is a stark one between engaging in clientelism and supporting full redistri-
bution. A priori this could appear to restrict its applicability to situations where
there is a credible redistributive party, a situation not present in many developing
countries. However, our interpretation of the model in terms of community mobili-
zation renders it more widely applicable. The ethnographic literature provides
ample evidence that a key trade-off faced by prospective clients in a variety of set-
tings is between clientelistic benefits and horizontal grassroots organizations (e.g.,
Fernández et al., 2017; Holzner, 2004; Mitlin and Mogaladi, 2013; Rutten, 2007;
Svampa and Pereyra, 2009).
2. Static model of clientelism
2.1. Set-up
General set-up. We consider a society of citizens (indexed by i and distributed in the
unit interval) all born with the same income: y. There is also a rich patron with
income such that average income in the society is y.2
The main decision that citizens take is between engaging in a clientelistic rela-
tionship with the rich patron or supporting a redistributive platform. The redistri-
butive platform might achieve a given level of income redistribution (yielding y to
everyone), but only with some probability P. Engaging in a clientelistic relation
with the patron provides citizens with a transfer T , given by the patron.
Each citizen holds an individual belief regarding P, the probability of success of
the redistribution platform. We denote this individual belief pi.3 Following social
psychology literature, we refer to pi as individual i’s efficacy beliefs. We assume
that individuals are born with a benchmark efficacy level p, which is common to
all citizens. As citizens go through life efficacy perceptions move away from this
benchmark according to the realization of a random variable ei : pi = p+ ei. For
simplicity, we assume that ei follows a uniform distribution with mean zero and
extremes 6s, where s thus denotes the extent of diversity of opinion regarding
efficacy.
Citizens care about their income as well as about inequality and its legitimacy.
We denote individual beliefs on how much inequality is delegitimized by ui. A key
innovation of the model is that, following social psychology literature, we allow cit-
izens to partly choose the degree of inequality delegitimation beliefs.
The timing of the model is as follows. First, individuals are born with bench-
mark efficacy p. Second, individuals choose inequality delegitimation ui and at the
same time the patron chooses clientelistic transfers T .4 Third, the idiosyncratic effi-
cacy shock ei is realized. Fourth, citizens decide whether to engage in clientelism or
support the redistributive platform. Finally, redistribution and transfers take place
as appropriate and players die.
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We assume that the actual probability of redistribution P equals the share of cit-
izens choosing redistribution over clientelism: the more citizens support redistribu-
tion, the more likely it is to succeed. The level of clientelism in the community is
the share of citizens choosing clientelism over redistribution and we denote it as C.
Therefore, by construction, C = 1 P.
Utility and choices. We assume that citizen’s utility depends on their income, and on
their views of inequality and its legitimacy. We capture inequality by the difference
between mean income and citizen’s income (y y). If an individual decides to
engage in clientelism, her utility is
V iC = p
iy+(1 pi)(y+T )+ ui(y y)½a (1 pi) ð1Þ
The first two terms are the utility from net income, which we assume as linear
for simplicity. Even if the individual chooses clientelism, successful redistribution
might still occur, with perceived probability pi. So net income equals average
income y with subjective probability pi and income y plus clientelistic transfers T
otherwise.
The second term is the utility consequences of inequality. A key innovation of
the model is the manner we introduce these consequences. Typically, inequality is
introduced directly in the utility function as inequality aversion. It is considered
that inequality generates disutility to the individual, and the strength of aversion
depends among others on how legitimate the income distribution is viewed (Alesina
and Giuliano, 2011). This corresponds to ui(y y) in the equation, where ui cap-
tures the strength of inequality delegitimation, and would typically enter the utility
function with a negative sign.
The social psychology literature, however, provides a more nuanced account
that focuses on the self-esteem consequences of legitimizing or delegitimizing
inequality. In a synthesis of social psychology theories, Major and Schmader
(2001) argue that perceiving inequality as illegitimate can be protective in the short
run, but is harmful if sustained ‘chronically.’5 We model this in the simplest possi-
ble way by considering that viewing inequality as illegitimate (high ui(y y)) has a
positive and a negative psychological effect, which correspond to ½a (1 pi) in
the equation. The parameter a\1 captures the initial positive self-esteem effect of
considering inequality as illegitimate. The term 1 pi captures the negative effect,
which accrues when one views inequality as illegitimate throughout one’s whole
life; this applies only in case there actually is inequality, i.e., if the redistributive
platform does not succeed, with perceived probability 1 pi.
We now consider citizen’s utility when supporting the redistributive platform.
We assume that if an individual chooses to support the redistributive platform, she
believes that her choice increases the chances of redistribution from pi to pi + g.
The parameter g can be thought of as group identification in the social psychology
literature. The idea is that having a high sense of group identification makes people
take the perspective of the group instead of the individual when considering the
implications of their actions. This leads them to consider that their choice has more
impact for the success of the redistribution platform. The exact value of parameter
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g and its interpretation in terms of group identification is not key to the model.
What is crucial is that g is higher than zero so that the individual perceives that her
support of the redistributive platform makes it more likely to succeed. We gener-
ally think of g as having a small value.
Citizens’ utility in case of supporting the redistributive platform is, thus,
V iR =(p
i + g)y+(1 pi  g)y+ ui(y y)½a (1 pi  g) ð2Þ
Citizens choose whether to engage in clientelism or support the redistributive
platform by comparing V iC and V
i
R.
Citizens are able to determine the degree of inequality delegitimation beliefs to
maximize their self-esteem. We assume that citizens can choose a set of behaviors
and information processing choices conductive to a given inequality delegitimation
belief zi, and that their actual level delegitimation belief ui is a linear combination
of this choice and a ‘true’ level of illegitimacy in the community, which we denote
by ~u.6 In particular, we assume that delegitimation perceptions equal:
ui(zijh, ~u)=h~u+(1 h)zi
The weight h 2 ½0, 1 captures the ability of people to influence their own
values.7
For simplicity, we assume that citizens choose zi so as to maximize, not overall
utility, but the part of utility that concerns the psychological effect of inequality
delegitimation. This formulation makes the model more tractable by separating
the political decision and the inequality delegitimation decision. Citizens thus seek
to maximize
ui(zi)(y y)½a (1 p)
where this maximand depends on benchmark efficacy p because this is the level of
efficacy that applies when making the decision. Because this maximization problem
has as possible solutions infinity and minus infinity, we impose a constraint that ui
cannot be unboundedly high or low: ui 2 ½u, u. Under these assumptions, the
choice of ui will be the same for all citizens and so we omit the superscript i from
now on.
The level of transfers offered as a clientelistic inducement T is chosen by the rich
patron. As the emphasis of this article is on the demand side of clientelism, we
model the supply side in a minimal way to keep the model tractable. We assume
that the patron wants to secure as many clients as possible, thereby reducing the
chances of redistribution P(T j:), while spending as little as possible in transfers. We
assume that transfers cannot be negative. Thus, the patron chooses transfers T to
maximize
VP(T )= 1 P(T j:) T
Equilibrium. To close the model, we impose a rational expectations equilibrium con-
dition. In particular, benchmark efficacy p is citizen’s (initial) belief regarding P, of
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how likely the redistributive platform is to succeed. We impose the condition that,
in equilibrium, such belief p needs to be equal to the true probability P. One can
think of this condition as requiring us to focus on situations where citizens do not
make strong or systematic mistakes.
Formally, the equilibrium of the model is a benchmark efficacy p*, actual prob-
ability of redistribution P*, level of clientelism C*, delegitimation beliefs u*, and
patron transfers T* such that:
(1) citizen i supports the redistributive platform if her utility from doing so is
higher than the utility from engaging in clientelism (and vice versa),
V iR(p
i(p*), u*, T *)ø V iC(p
i(p*), u*, T *)




i s:t: V i
R




and the level of clientelism is the complementary share C*(p*, u*, T*)= 1 P*
(p*, u*, T *);
(3) the patron chooses transfers T* so that
T* = argmax
T ø 0
1 P*(p*, u*, T ) T
(4) choice z* and the corresponding inequality delegitimation u* satisfy
z*(p*)= argmax u(z)(y y)½a (1 p*)
s:t: u(z)=h~u+(1 h)z) and u 2 ½u, u
thus
u*(p*)=h~u+(1 h)z*(p*)
(5) citizens have rational expectations in the sense that
p* =P*(p*, u*, T*)
2.2. Results static model
The model delivers multiple equilibria as shown in the following proposition.8





\B(u)\1, and focusing on the case s = 1
2
, we have the following.
(1) There are three possible equilibria:
 traditional clientelism, P* = p* = 0, C* = 1, u* = u;
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 modern clientelism, P* = p* = 1 a, C =a, u* = 1
4g(yy) 1;
 no clientelism, P* = p* = 1, C = 0, u* = u.
(2) Using the subscript M for the modern clientelism equilibrium and T for the
traditional clientelism equilibrium, transfers T*M . T
*
T . The difference
between the two can be decomposed into two positive parts:













The model delivers three possible equilibria. Two of them are extreme, one with
full clientelism, minimum efficacy, and the least possible inequality delegitimation
u; and another with no clientelism at all, maximum efficacy, and strong inequality
delegitimation. We denote the full clientelism equilibrium as ‘traditional clientelism’
because it implies that social inequalities are legitimized.
In addition to these extreme equilibria, there is also an intermediate one. In this
equilibrium, levels of efficacy, clientelism, and inequality legitimation are inter-
mediate. We denote this equilibrium ‘modern clientelism’ because it does not
involve the legitimation of inequality.
The multiplicity of equilibria result from two types of complementarities in the
model. In order to understand how these complementarities come about, we
explain the result in three steps. First, we consider how the actual probability of
redistribution P depends on benchmark efficacy p and inequality delegitimation u,
incorporating the clientelism choice of the citizens and the transfer choice of the
patron. We write this as P(p, uj:) indicating that the probability of redistribution P
is considered for all possible levels of p and u, not specifically the equilibrium lev-
els. Then, as second and third steps, we incorporate the rational expectations equi-
librium condition and the choice of inequality delegitimation which, together, pin
down the equilibrium.
Figure 1 shows how the probability of redistribution P(p, uj:) depends on bench-
mark efficacy p and inequality delegitimation u. Darker shades of gray indicate a
higher actual probability of redistribution.
The probability of redistribution P(p, uj:) is increasing in both benchmark effi-
cacy p and delegitimation u. This comes from the clientelism choices of citizens (the
comparison of V iR and V
i
C). Citizens are heterogenous in efficacy beliefs and this
heterogeneity implies that some citizens may engage in clientelism whereas others
choose redistribution. The probability of redistribution P equals the share of citi-
zens that choose redistribution. Intuitively, if generally people think that the redis-
tribution platform has high chances of success (high benchmark efficacy p) or if
they think that inequality is very illegitimate (high u), a greater share of them will
support redistribution.
The clientelism choices of citizens also depend on the level of transfers T that
the patron chooses. However, as Figure 1 and the proof of Proposition 1 show, this
pattern holds even when we account for the fact that the level of transfers T is
endogenous. The more efficacious citizens feel and the more they delegitimize
inequality, the harder it is for the patron to buy them off. Thus, if efficacy p and
delegitimation u are very low, it is very cheap for the patron to buy off everyone
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and we are in the ‘full clientelism’ (P= 0) regime in Figure 1. As efficacy and dele-
gitimation increase, the patron starts to give up clients gradually. This corresponds
to the ‘interior’ regime, where some citizens are clients and others are not. As effi-
cacy and delegitimation keep on increasing, eventually all citizens become too
expensive and clientelism stops making sense for the patron. This is the ‘clientelism
too expensive’ (P= 1) regime, where no one becomes a client and redistribution is
all but certain.
Figure 1 shows the probability of redistribution P(p, uj:) for all possible values
of benchmark efficacy p and delegitimation u. However, in the model, both p and
u are endogenous. How are they determined? We consider as a second step bench-
mark efficacy p, while still taking delegitimation u as given.
Benchmark efficacy p is pinned down in the model via the rational expectation
condition: of all the possible levels of benchmark efficacy p, the rational expectation
condition singles out those that are consistent with the actual probability of redis-
tribution P, where p=P(p). This is depicted in Figure 2: different levels of bench-
mark efficacy can be sustained in the rational expectation equilibrium depending
on the level of inequality delegitimation u. We thus write the rational expectation
levels of benchmark efficacy as p(u). This figure builds on the previous one: it shows
the (p, u) space with the boundaries of the ‘full clientelism,’ the ‘interior,’ and the
‘clientelism too expensive’ regimes that implied different probability of redistribu-
tion P(p, u). On top of this is, the figure adds in bold the levels of benchmark effi-
cacy p(u) consistent with rational expectations.
The figure shows that it is possible to ‘rationally’ sustain high, medium, and low
benchmark efficacy beliefs in this model. In other words, a priori, p(u)= 0 can
potentially be an equilibrium, and so can p(u)= 1, as well as other intermediate
Figure 1. Probability of redistribution P(p, u).
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values. This multiplicity comes from the first complementary in the model, between
efficacy and redistribution, which makes it possible to sustain many different
levels of efficacy. High efficacy perceptions induce citizens to support redistribu-
tion; this leads to little clientelism and a high probability of redistribution which
validates the initial efficacy perceptions. This corresponds to the top section of p(u)
in Figure 2, where the community is in the ‘clientelism too expensive’ regime, and
no one becomes a client (P= 1). The converse leads to the bottom section of p(u)
in the figure, where the community is in the ‘full clientelism’ regime. Intermediate
levels of efficacy beliefs can also be supported in equilibrium, corresponding to the
vertical section of p(u) in the interior regime. Efficacy perceptions in this model are
‘self-fulfilling prophecies.’
However, as the figure shows and the notation p(u) reminds us, the levels of effi-
cacy and clientelism that can be sustained in this model depend on inequality dele-
gitimation. For instance, only communities that delegitimize inequality strongly
will be able to support non-clientelistic equilibria.
The third and final step of the model solution integrates the endogeneity of dele-
gitimation beliefs u. Citizens choose how much to delegitimize inequality in order
to maximize their self-esteem. Whether or not it pays off to delegitimize inequality
depends on efficacy beliefs p. Therefore, this choice delivers a function u(p). We can
depict this function adding it to the previous figure, as shown by the bold dashed
line in Figure 3.
The schedule u(p) is increasing in p: if citizens have strong efficacy perceptions
and believe that redistribution is likely (p high), it pays off to consider inequality as
Figure 2. Benchmark efficacy levels consistent with rational expectations.
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illegitimate; but if citizens feel inefficacious rather powerless (p low), thinking that
redistribution has no chance, they are better off legitimizing inequality. This result
is consistent with recent empirical findings in social psychology of legitimacy.
Experimental evidence has shown that powerlessness (Van der Toorn et al., 2015),
or perceptions that the environment is hard to change (Johnson and Fujita, 2012;
Pellicer et al., 2018, 2019) lead people to find the system more legitimate and/ or
display preferences against changing it.
The equilibria of the model are the intersections between the schedules p(u) and
u(p). There are three intersections that correspond to the three equilibria in
Proposition 1. The multiplicity of equilibria here emerge from a second comple-
mentarity in the model, between inequality delegitimation and efficacy/redistribu-
tion. When citizens feel powerless and inefficacious, they believe that redistribution
will not occur and inequality will remain high. In that situation, they are better-off
by legitimizing inequality. Considering inequality legitimate, in turn, makes redis-
tribution less appealing, further consolidating clientelism and inefficacy beliefs.
This is the traditional clientelism equilibrium. The reverse situation is also possible,
with high efficacy beliefs, redistribution demands, and inequality delegitimation
reinforcing each other. This is the no clientelism equilibrium. The modern cliente-
lism equilibrium has intermediate values in these variables.
The second part of Proposition 1 shows that clients get a better deal from clien-
telism in the modern clientelism equilibrium relative to the traditional one. The
decomposition shown in the proposition shows that there are two reasons for this.
Figure 3. Static equilibria.
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First, the delegitimation of inequality in the traditional clientelism equilibrium
u*T is lower than in the modern clientelism equilibrium u
*
M . This implies that citizens
in the traditional equilibrium are willing to give up redistribution more easily and
are cheaper to buy than in the modern clientelism equilibrium.
Second, even for given inequality delegitimation, there is a positive difference
between the transfers in the two equilibria. This difference comes the fact that the
traditional clientelism equilibrium features ‘full clientelism’ (the transfers chosen by
the patron are a corner solution); whereas the modern clientelism equilibrium fea-
tures citizens at the margin between clientelism and redistribution (transfer choice
is an interior solution). The patron gives more transfers when transfers are useful,
and transfers are more useful when they manage to sway many voters. When there
are few or no ‘marginal’ voters (as in the traditional clientelism equilibrium), the
patron can afford to lower transfers without losing much.
3. Dynamic extension
The static equilibrium tells us that communities may end up being highly redistri-
butive, or clientelistic in the traditional or in the modern sense. We consider here a
dynamic extension of the model that provides insights on the conditions under
which communities will converge to each of these equilibria.
In keeping with the paper’s focus on the client, and in particular on client’s per-
ceptions, we keep the patron side as simple as possible, and focus on the dynamics
of clientelism, efficacy, and inequality delegitimation beliefs.
3.1. Set-up
In the dynamic extension, each citizen has one offspring, and dynasties are indexed
by t.
There are two main additions to the static model. First, the choice of inequality
delegitimation is made (arguably) more realistic. In the static model, individuals
themselves selected their own delegitimation beliefs. Now we assume that the level
of delegitimation belief of generation t+ 1 is (partly) determined by the educational
choices zt of their parents: ut + 1(zt).
Second, in order to keep the model tractable, we assume that income is gener-
ated from capital k (that can be thought of as land), which transforms into income
following a simple linear technology: citizen income is y= k and average income is
y= k. At the end of their life, citizens consume the totality of their income and pass
over to their offspring all their capital k. This allows us to keep income constant
across generations regardless of income changes within a generation: even if the
redistributive platform succeeds and redistribution takes place, citizens in the next
generation start with capital k and thus face the same problem all over again.
The timing is as follows. Citizens, again indexed by i, in generation t are born
with capital k (constant across generations), and benchmark efficacy pt, and acquire
their inequality delegitimation level ut.
9 They produce y of income (also constant
across generations) and have an offspring. Then they choose the level of
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delegitimation zt to transmit to their offspring.
10 At the same time, the patron
chooses the level of transfers Tt. Then the idiosyncratic efficacy shock e
i takes place.
Citizens then decide whether to engage in clientelism or support the redistributive
platform. This determines the actual probability of redistribution Pt and the level
of clientelism Ct in the community. The corresponding redistribution and/or trans-
fers take place and citizens consume all their income and die, leaving their capital k
to their offspring.
Most of the elements of the model remain as in the static model. The utility func-
tion of citizens when choosing clientelism or support for redistribution VC and VR
are given by (1) and (2), with the appropriate time subscripts (i.e., y,y, g, and a are
constant, whereas pit, ut, and Tt are time varying). The idiosyncratic efficacy shock
ei follows a uniform distribution with mean zero and extremes 6s. The patron
chooses transfers Tt in order to maximize 1 Pt(Tt) Tt, also as in the static model.
This implies that even if the model is dynamic, decisions of actors are myopic. This
is an important limitation of the model which we impose for tractability. Even with
these limitations, we believe that the dynamic extension provides useful insights on
the conditions under which communities will converge towards different types of
clientelism equilibria.
As before, actual delegitimation perceptions are a combination of (parental)
choices and the ‘true’ (il)legitimacy of inequality in the community ~u:
ut + 1(zt)=h~u+(1 h)zt ð8Þ
The weight h 2 ½0, 1 captures now the ability of parents to influence children’s
values. A high h implies that parents have little influence.
In addition, as before, we assume that parents transmit legitimation values in
order to maximize self-esteem, in this case their children’s. However, it is reason-
able to assume that there are adjustment costs in the transmission of values, in the
sense that it is psychologically costly for parents to transmit values far away from
those they believe themselves. For simplicity, these costs are assumed to be quadra-
tic. The maximization problem of the parent is therefore
Max ut + 1(zt)(y y)(a (1 pt)
1
2
(zt  ut)2 ð9Þ
Because, in this case, the solutions to the maximization problem are bounded, it
is not necessary to impose the additional condition that ui 2 ½u, u.
In the static model, we imposed rational expectations in the formation of bench-
mark efficacy beliefs pt. Here we impose a possibly more realistic assumption that
children’s benchmark efficacy beliefs are based on the clientelism/redistribution
choices of their parents. In other words, we assume a sort of ‘adaptive’ expecta-
tions whereby the benchmark efficacy of generation t + 1, pt + 1 equals the actual
probability of redistribution in period t: pt + 1 =Pt.
For completeness, we assume there are exogenously given initial levels of capital,
benchmark efficacy, and inequality delegitimation at the start of life of generation 0: k0,
p0, and u0.
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3.2. Dynamics and stable steady states
The dynamic model yields the following key result.
Proposition 2 (Stable steady states). There are two dynamic regimes, depending on
whether diversity of opinion s and parental influence on children’s values h are high
or low.
 If, for given h, s is sufficiently low or if, for given s, h is sufficiently low:
- there are two stable steady states, the traditional clientelism steady state
and the no clientelism steady state;
- if initial levels of efficacy and/or inequality legitimation are low, commu-
nities will converge to the traditional clientelism steady state; otherwise,
they will converge to the no clientelism steady state.
 If, for given h, s is sufficiently high or if, for given s, h is sufficiently high:
- there are two stable steady states, the modern clientelism steady state and
the no clientelism steady state;
- communities will converge towards the modern clientelism steady state
unless initial efficacy and inequality delegitimation are sufficiently high to
make clientelism not worth it for the patron.
Proposition 2 states that the path that a community follows depends on the
extent of diversity of opinion in the community, on how much influence parents
have on children’s values, and on its starting levels of efficacy and delegitimation.
Figure 4 illustrates the main results, depicting the dynamics of the system for the
two regimes in the proposition.
To understand Figure 4, it is useful to recall the solution of the static model.
The graphs in Figure 4 are very similar to the graph for the static equilibrium in
Figure 3. Both have as axis efficacy p and delegitimation u. There is a bold solid
line representing how efficacy depends on delegitimation (labeled here Dp= 0) and
Figure 4. Dynamics.
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a bold dashed line representing how delegitimation in turns depends on efficacy
(labeled here Du= 0). These lines now capture situations where efficacy and delegi-
timation, respectively, are at rest. The intersection between the two lines shows the
steady states of the dynamic model, i.e., the situations where efficacy and delegiti-
mation are simultaneously at rest. These points are the counterpart of the multiple
equilibria in the static model and can be considered ‘dynamic equilibria.’ The key
is that some of these equilibria will be stable and some others will not, and commu-
nities are likely to end up only in the stable ones.
There are two important differences between the static and dynamic figures.
First, we now have information on how the system moves outside these resting
positions. This is given by arrows in the figure. This gives us which equilibria are
stable and which are unstable. Second, in contrast to the static model, the slopes of
the equilibrium curves are neither horizontal nor vertical. They now depend on the
parameters, and in particular the parental influence parameter h and the diversity
of opinion s, which is now not constrained to 1
2
. In particular, the left graph shows
a case where h and s are low. As the appendix shows, this implies that the line
Du= 0 is flatter than the middle section of Dp= 0. The right graph shows the
opposite case. The dynamics of the system (i.e., the direction of the arrows) turn
out to be different in these two cases.
Proposition 2 states that traditional clientelism will be stable if there is little
diversity of opinion in the community and if parents have a major influence on
their children’s values (low s and h). This is shown in the left panel of Figure 4
with arrows that tend towards the equilibrium at the bottom left corner. When
there is a lot of diversity of opinion in the community and parents have little influ-
ence on children, the modern clientelism equilibrium is stable. This is shown in the
right panel, with arrows pointing towards the equilibrium at the center.
The intuition behind this result is that high diversity of opinion and low paternal
influence tend to break the complementarities that support traditional clientelism.
When there is little diversity of opinion, the dynamic path of efficacy is explosive:
efficacy tends to go towards extremes where either everyone becomes a client or no
one does. Then, the complementarity between inefficacy and clientelism in the sta-
tic model prevails. If efficacy is low, essentially everyone will find it worthwhile to
engage in clientelism; the next generation will have as benchmark a perception of
almost zero efficacy, and the society will remain clientelistic. Diversity of opinion,
however, can break this cycle. If idiosyncratic shocks are sufficiently large, even in
a situation where most parents are clientelistic, there will be a substantial amount
of children that are exposed to experiences that lead to entertain relatively high effi-
cacy, and the society will avoid becoming totally clientelistic. Efficacy will then
tend to converge towards intermediate values.
Regarding, inequality delegitimation, there are two forces that govern its
dynamics. First, there is a tendency to go towards the ‘true’ level ~u. This is because
the actual delegitimation beliefs in a generation is partly determined by its ‘true’
level in the community and people find it difficult to pass on to their children val-
ues very different from their own. However, legitimation perceptions also move
independently of real injustice, from the attempts of parents to protect their
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children’s self-esteem, as in the static model: If efficacy is low enough, parents will
realize that high inequality is largely inevitable and will want to shield their chil-
dren from the pain of bearing a harmful sense of injustice throughout their lives.
Thus, they will make them less sensitive to injustice and delegitimation perceptions
will decrease over time. The reverse occurs if efficacy is high.
The relative importance of ‘reality’ considerations versus parental influences is
determined by h, the scope of parents to affect children’s perceptions. If h is low
and children’s values are heavily influenced by their parents, inequality delegitima-
tion perceptions will drift independently of reality following parental attempts to
protect their children. In contrast, if parents have little influence on children’s val-
ues (high h), regardless of the previous generation efforts, the following generations
will display delegitimation perceptions approaching ever closer the ‘real’~u.
A good way to summarize this discussion is to interpret Proposition 2 in terms
of the degree of informational connectivity of the community towards the outside
world. The complementarities that drive traditional clientelism in the dynamic
model rest on the intergenerational linkages of efficacy and legitimation. It is the
parental clientelism choices and their attempts at protecting children self-esteem
that set the community in a path towards traditional clientelism. These intergenera-
tional linkages are most prominent in informationally isolated communities. In
communities that are strongly connected to the outside world, alternative external
political narratives have a stronger contribution on children perceptions. This
breaks the complementarities between inefficacy, clientelism, and legitimation, and
allows the community to settle in an intermediate equilibrium. Proposition 2 can
be interpreted as saying essentially that traditional types of clientelism are more
likely to occur in informationally isolated communities. As communities become
more informationally connected, clientelism may transform into a more instrumen-
tal, ‘modern’ type.
Whereas the type of clientelism equilibrium that is stable depends on parameters,
the ‘no clientelism’ equilibrium at the top right of the graphs is always stable,
regardless of diversity of opinion or the extent of parental influence. Communities
end up in the no clientelism equilibrium if citizens start (or exogenously become)
sufficiently efficacious and delegitimizing. Then, the community gets into a defini-
tive path away from clientelism with no turning back: citizens become too expen-
sive and the patron gives up clientelism.
4. Discussion
The model delivers insights on different types of clientelism, and on how tradi-
tional clientelism may transform into a modern variety. This section discusses these
mechanisms and illustrates them with examples from the literature.
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4.1. Traditional and modern clientelism
An important insight from the model concerns different types of clientelism. The
model predicts two types of clientelistic equilibria, ‘traditional’ and ‘modern,’ that
differ in inequality legitimation, stability, and in the benefits that the clients obtain.
The distinction between traditional types and modern types of clientelism is
clearly made by scholars of clientelism in the 1960s and 1970s (e.g., Weingrod,
1968). Traditional clientelism is embedded in social relations, involves an exchange
of loyalty in a setting viewed as largely legitimate by the clients, and is considered
to be more durable and stable. Modern clientelism, such as machine clientelism or
vote-buying, is generally viewed as a one-shot and largely anonymous quid pro
quo exchange of money or small goods for votes.
The term traditional might lead to the misperception that this form of cliente-
lism is waning or outdated. Traditional ties often underlie clientelistic exchanges.
Even in settings that appear ‘modern,’ the type of clientelism experienced from the
client’s point of view, is often closer to the traditional type. Discussing the operation
of party machines in African countries in the 1960s, Lemarchand (1972) described
the ‘neo-traditional machine,’ in which ‘traditional micro-level solidarities provide
the essential linkages between the party and the masses.’ In this case, he argues,
‘the machine is superimposed upon, and in some ways tributary to, the clientelistic
subsystem’ (p. 114). Similarly, Archer’s (1990) analysis of broker clientelism in
Colombia shows that a ‘primary’ patron–client cluster ‘strongly dependant on kin-
ship and localist ties is the basic building block’ of these modern networks (pp. 22–
23). Such primary relationships involve high levels of affect and respect (p. 31) as
in the traditional form of clientelism. More recently, Gottlieb (2017) and Kramon
(2017) also noted the importance of traditional leaders as brokers in clientelistic
exchanges in some African countries.
Legitimation. One of the main differences between the two types of clientelistic equili-
bria in the model is the degree of inequality legitimation by citizens. In particular, citi-
zens are predicted to legitimize social inequalities in the ‘traditional’ steady state. It is
this distinction that largely warrants the use of the terms traditional versus modern.
Legitimacy is one of the key notions in the characterization of traditional forms
of clientelism. Traditional clientelism involves ‘loyalty’ and ‘deference’ from the cli-
ent’s side and affection as a key feature of the links between client and patron
(Landé, 1977: p. XXIX). These ties are often likened to father–children relations,
where the patron affords protection and security and the client reciprocates with
deference and respect. Accordingly, Silverman’s (1977) work on clientelism in
Central Italy notes the ‘close connection between ‘‘patronage’’ and ‘‘paternalism’’’
(p. 297).
More recent ethnographic work suggests a similar role of paternalism and defer-
ence in traditional clientelistic ties. Arghiros (2001) described patrons in traditional
forms of clientelism in Thailand as ‘archetypal paternalistic and authoritarian
leader,’ ‘respected by villagers of all ages’ (pp. 74–75). Paller’s (2014) work on
political patrons (‘big men’) in urban Ghana argued that ‘leaders are expected to
be the patriarchs not only of their biological families, but also of a broader
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constituency’ and become ‘the head of a group of followers who perceive their
leader as a father figure’ (p. 127).
A somewhat different way of legitimizing unequal relations is the traditional-
style broker client relations described by Auyero (1999, 2000) in present-day
Argentina. Instead of perceiving patrons as father figures, they are described as
‘friends.’ Clients depict brokers as ‘being so good’ or ‘always lending a hand.’
Although brokers control material resources on which clients rely, clients de-
emphasize and rationalize the inequality in their relationship. Similarly to more
standard traditional relations, the unequal status-quo in which the relation takes
place is not put into question by the clients.
In contrast, modern clientelism is typically characterized as an exclusively mate-
rial transaction involving purely opportunistic patrons and clients. Rather than
legitimizing the relationship or inequality in general, clients are portrayed as hav-
ing a highly cynical attitude towards politicians (Becerra Mizuno, 2013; Gay, 1998;
Lazar, 2004). This attitude is exemplified by a vote-seller in the Dominican
Republic: ‘(the parties) are all the same. They come around during elections, and
never again. If I can get a few pesos for voting, then that’s enough for me’
(Gonzalez-Acosta, 2008).
Stability. The dynamics of the model suggest that modern clientelism will be rela-
tively fluid, whereas traditional clientelism will be very stable. In the modern case,
any change in parameters will affect the schedules Du= 0 and Dp= 0, leading to a
change in the steady state, and thus to a permanent change in the level of cliente-
lism. The situation is different in traditional steady states. There, changes in the
environment that affect the benefits and costs of clientelism will have no fundamen-
tal or long-lasting effect on clientelism. Even if these changes succeed in affecting
clientelism in the short run the values of clients make the community return endo-
genously to the traditional situation. The very fact that social inequality is legiti-
mized in the traditional steady state makes this situation very difficult to change.
Indeed, in the literature, one of the key characteristics of traditional clientelism
is its stability. Moreover, as in the model, authors link this stability directly to
legitimacy (Archer, 1990; Powell, 1970; Silverman, 1977; Weingrod, 1968). An
example of the role of legitimation practices for the resilience of clientelistic rela-
tions is given by the work of Foltz (1969) on Senegal. A ‘patron does not buy cli-
ent’s support and recognition’ (emphasis in the original). ‘Public gift-giving is a
patterned process, designed to ennoble the giver and reflect ‘‘high concern for
honor’’, not an underhanded and reprehensible attempt to buy support and status.’
Thus, the author concludes: ‘As such, it is a particularly difficult pattern to extir-
pate, and one that is likely to continue to pervade many aspects of Senegalese life’
(p. 244). Other authors note how the stability of traditional clientelism is cemented
by creating vertical kinship between patron and client, for example by patrons
becoming godfathers of clients’ children (e.g., Archer, 1990; Silverman, 1977).
Authors have also noted how the legitimation patterns in traditional clientelism
may delay horizontal mobilization, as in the model. As Silverman (1977: pp.
296{297) observes, ‘the paternalism of the mezzandria [the landlord–peasant
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relation giving rise to ‘‘traditional’’ clientelism], has often been pointed to as a fac-
tor in delaying the spread of labor agitation to the Central Italian hill region for
several decades after its onset in many agricultural areas of the nation about 1870.’
Client’s benefits. The model suggests that clients will receive a better deal in modern
settings relative to traditional ones. This point has been frequently made in the liter-
ature. The argument is usually made from the supply side. Modern clientelism has
brought an increase in patron competition that decreases their relative bargaining
power (Corstange, 2018; Hilgers, 2012: e.g.,).
Our model complements this insight by focusing on the demand side. In the
model there are two reasons why traditional clients get a worse deal. First, tradi-
tional steady states are situations of full clientelism, where the patron has already
secured the whole community and can thus afford to save on transfers. This is also
about competition: it is the fact that the patron does not need to compete for cli-
ents in traditional settings that gives her extra bargaining power. Our model adds
to the literature in showing that competition need not be about how many patrons
there are, but more generally about the availability of other valued political alter-
natives for clients. Traditional settings reduce the bargaining power clients because
the horizontal alternative is pushed out of the competition.
The second reason why, in the model, clients get a bad deal in traditional set-
tings is that the very legitimation of inequality associated with traditional cliente-
lism weakens their bargaining power. This can address the puzzle of how this type
of clientelism can survive even in current settings, even if there are many socio-
economic and institutional breaks to clientelistic politics (see Nichter (2018) for a
discussion of such factors). Clients can get stuck in a situation where their very
own values weaken their bargaining power because these values are a psychological
adaptive reaction to a situation where citizens feel inefficacious.
4.2. Breaking versus transforming clientelism
There are two paths by which traditional types of clientelism may disappear in the
model. Traditional clientelism may either fully give way to horizontal, programma-
tic, mobilization or it might transform into a more modern type.
Current literature proposes several explanations for how clientelism gives way
to programmatic politics. Studies focus on how increases in citizen income or insti-
tutional changes such as the introduction of the secret ballot increased the cost of
clientelism for patrons (see Aidt and Jensen (2017), Kitschelt and Kselman (2013),
and Stokes et al. (2013) as well as the discussion in Nichter (2018)).12
Our model emphasizes the role of clients beliefs for the disappearance of cliente-
lism. In the model, dramatic shifts of parameters that massively strengthen clients
can bring communities to a path that leads them away from clientelism. For
instance, an exogenous increase in efficacy beliefs can turn the dynamics of efficacy
and legitimacy perceptions upside down leading to ever more efficacy, less legiti-
mation, and less clientelism.
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A good illustration of these dynamics is given by Thompson (1963), the classic
account of the emergence of worker organization in 19th century England. Before
the 19th century, the status quo was maintained by a mix of deference, clientelistic
inducements, and force. This changed during the beginning of the 19th century, as
horizontal organization consolidated: there was a ‘general and radical change in
the character of the labouring classes. The poor, when suffering and dissatisfied, no
longer make a riot, but hold a meeting -instead of attacking their neighbors, they
arraign a Ministry’ (p. 464).
Thompson (1963) showed that the process of horizontal organization was
accompanied by working class self-confidence (i.e., efficacy), and away from defer-
ence towards elites (i.e., delegitimation). Summarizing the main point of his book
in a later postscript, he argued: ‘I have tried [...] to show that they were coming to
act, think, and feel, not in the old modes of deference and parochial seclusion, but
in class ways’ (p. 937). Thompson emphasized the critical role of efficacy percep-
tions: ‘It was a question of morale [emphasis in original]; at its simplest level it
meant that it was possible for individual working men to have a sense [...] of sus-
tained commitment to a movement for their own class objectives, and a confidence
that enabled them to stand up against the physical and moral resources of their
opponents’ (p. 938). These changes in horizontal organization, self-confidence, and
delegitimation were mutually reinforcing: ‘The effect upon the reformers’ morale
of each successive demonstration was instantaneous. With each breach in the walls
of deference, the waters of insubordination swept through’ (p. 748).
What kickstarted this process? This was a turbulent moment with many major
simultaneous structural changes, but two major ‘exogenous shocks’ may have
played a role. First, the French Revolution of 1789 represented a massive shock to
efficacy perceptions. Second, the Industrial Revolution eroded deference: ‘This
growth in self-respect and political consciousness was one real gain of the
Industrial Revolution. It dispelled some forms of superstition and deference, and
made certain kinds of oppression no longer tolerable’ (p. 464).
The other way in which traditional clientelism may disappear in the model is by
becoming transformed into a more modern type. Scott (1972), describing the trans-
formation in the nature of clientelistic linkages in South East Asia, argues that one
of the key developments has been a loss of its ‘traditional legitimacy.’ This implied
a shift in the balance between affective and instrumental ties in the direction of the
latter, with exchanges becoming more ‘monetized’ and focusing ‘more on the rate
of return from the relation rather than on its durability’ (pp. 106–107). Silverman
(1977) gives another example of such transformation in her study of Central Italy
during the second half of the 19th and first half of the 20th century. She argues
that as traditional clientelism disappeared, the political linkages of citizens chan-
ged, including more ‘structurally horizontal links’ as well as clientelistic relations,
but of a short and more targeted nature (p. 303).
In the model, such transformation can come about via an increase in informational
connectivity of the community, which changes the dynamics of the system, breaking
the complementarity between efficacy and delegitimation. Weingrod (1968) studied
such transformation of clientelism in the Italian island of Sardinia. His work explicitly
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attributes the reason for such transformation to an increase in the community’s connec-
tivity to the outside world. Through the evolution of indicators of community isolation,
such as intra-village marriage or intra-village godfathering, he shows how such evolu-
tion coincides with the transformation in clientelism. Noting the increasing connections
with the outside in terms of education, economic ties, or the spread of mass media such
as radio or television, he argues that this new participation in the ‘mass society’ breaks
old linkages and gives predominance to new ones where political party patronage
becomes key. More recent studies (see Archer (1990) for Colombia, Arghiros (2001)
for Thailand, and Shefner (2001) for Mexico) note a similar role of connectivity for the
transformation of clientelism away from paternalistic types and towards a more instru-
mental vote-buying type.
5. Concluding remarks
This article has argued that bringing insights from social psychology, notably on
inequality legitimation, can fruitfully advance research on clientelism. In particu-
lar, this can provide a novel perspective on why some poor people engage in clien-
telism whereas others do not, and on why some communities experience traditional
as opposed to vote-buying types of clientelism.
We have proposed a model where citizens decide whether to engage in cliente-
lism or support a redistributive platform and hold beliefs on efficacy and the legiti-
mation of inequality. Many insights of the model derive from the fundamental
insight that people adapt their values and beliefs to features of their environment,
as emphasized in recent research in social psychology (Duckitt and Sibley, 2010;
Jost et al., 2003). In the model, the clientelism choices of the poor affect their effi-
cacy and inequality legitimation beliefs, and vice versa. This interaction between
political choices and beliefs generates multiple equilibria with different levels and
different types of clientelism.
We believe that bringing the client and her beliefs and values into the center
stage of studies of clientelism can broaden our understanding of the mechanics,
dynamics, and welfare implications of clientelism.
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Proof. 1. We proceed as follows. First, we derive the clientelistic decisions of citi-
zens given all the others variables and parameters of the model. Second we com-
pute the probability of redistribution P(p, u, T j:), again given all variables and
parameters of the model. Third, we solve for the patron choice of transfers
T (p, uj:), given benchmark efficacy and inequality delegitimation. Then we solve
for the inequality delegitimation choice to obtain u(p), given benchmark efficacy.
Finally, we impose the rational expectations condition that p=P(p).
Comparing VC and VR in (1) and (2), and solving for p
i gives a critical value of
efficacy p̂ above which people support redistribution: choose redistributive plat-
form if pi.p̂(u, T )[ 1 B(u)
T
, where B(u)[ g(y y)(1+ u).
The probability of redistribution P(p, u, T j:), given the values of p, u, and T ,
equals the share of citizens with efficacy pi.p̂. As pi = p+ ei, this share is
Prob(ei.p̂ p). Using the fact that ei is distributed following a uniform distribu-
tion with mean zero and extremes 6s yields
P(p, u, T jy,y,s, g)=
0 if p  p̂(u, T ) s
1
2s
(p+s  p̂(u, T )) if p̂(u, T ) s\p  p̂(u, T )+s
1 if p.p̂(u, T )+s
8<
: ð3Þ
where p̂ [ 1 B(u)
T
The patron chooses transfers in order to maximize his utility
VP = 1 P(p, u, T ) T , subject to T ø 0, where P(p, u, T ) is given just above.
There are three regimes of transfers chosen by the patron:
T (p, ujy,y,s, g)=
B(u)




if p0(u)\p  p1(u) (Interior : 0\C\1)


















follows from the first-order condition of the maximi-




which also implies clearly that the second-order condition holds.
There are three potential corner solutions. First, from the constraint T ø 0. At
the corner T (p, u)= 0, p̂! ‘ and, therefore, P= 1 and VP = 0.
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The other two potential corner solutions correspond to the range of values where
P= 0 and P= 1 in Equation (3). For these, VP equals 1 T and T , respectively.
The latter can never be optimal because it will always be lower than the corner solu-
tion T (p, u)= 0. The former is maximized with the minimum possible transfers con-
sistent with the domain over which it applies. This domain is p  p̂ s, and the
minimum T (p, u) in this domain is B
1ps, the transfer applying in the ‘full cliente-
lism’ case.
The corner solution T (p, u)= 0 applies when the utility VP evaluated at the inte-





This is the boundary for the ‘clientelism too expensive’ regime.
It can be readily checked that VP evaluated at the interior solution is higher than
or equal to that evaluated at the full clientelism solution. Thus, the interior solution
holds as long as the relevant corner constraint p  p̂ s evaluated at the interior




[ p0(u), which is then the
boundary for the ‘full clientelism’ regime.
The thresholds p0 and p1 concern comparisons between the interior regime and
the other two regimes. They are relevant as long as the interior regime applies.
Otherwise, the relevant threshold is from the comparison between the full cliente-
lism and the ‘clientelism too expensive’ regimes, which deliver a threshold
p2 = 1 s  B. This threshold is relevant when B . 2s. Then, p1 and p0 are not
relevant because p0 . p1 and p2 . p0, which imply that the relevant comparison is
between the ‘full clientelism’ and the ‘clientelism too expensive’ regimes, which is
given by p2. Thus, the result in the proposition holds as long as B(u) \ 2s. In equi-




By plugging-in the expression for transfers T (p, u) into the actual probability of
redistribution P(p, u, T j:) in Equation (3), we can derive the probability of redistri-
bution P(p, uj:) only as a function of efficacy p and delegitimation u. This is
obtained by plugging the interior solution in (4) into (3) and noting that in the full
clientelism regime P= 0 and in the ‘clientelism too expensive’ regime, P= 1:
P(p, ujy,y,s, g)=












where p0(u) and p1(u) are defined previously.
We now turn to the citizens choice of inequality delegitimation. Citizens choose z to
maximize u(z)(y y)(a (1 p)), where u(z)=h~u+(1 h)z and with the restriction
that u 2 ½u, u. Solving this maximization problem immediately implies that
u(pj:) 2
u if p\1 a
½u, u if p= 1 a
u if p.1 a
8<
: ð6Þ
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The function u(pja) depends only on variables and parameters common to the
community. This warrants our assertion that all citizens make choices that lead
them to the same level of delegitimation and is the reason why we drop the super-
script i for the variable u.
One possible way to finalize the solution of the model from here is to plug u(pj:)
into P(p, uj:), to obtain P(pj:), and then apply the rational expectations equilibrium
condition p=P(pj:).
We follow another possible avenue. First, we apply the rational expectations
equilibrium condition p=P(p, uj:) to (5), which delivers a condition p(u) and then
we solve the system of equations formed by this equation, p(u), and the equation
u(p), from the determination of delegitimation in (6).





, the probability of redistribution P(p, uj:) in (5) equals
P(p, uj:)=
































The condition p(u) that results from applying the equilibrium condition p=P(p)
to P(p, uj:) is
p(uj:)=
f0g if B(u)\ 1
16





[f1g if B(u)= 1
4












because then p= 0 leads to P= 0. This happens when B  1
4
. Second, the same
argument implies that p(uj:)= 1 is a fixed point when B ø 1
16







(or, equivalently, B= 1
4







 p  3
2
 2B and B= 1
4
, which implies it holds when
p 2 ½0, 1
2
.
We now just need to solve the system of equations given by p(uj:) in (7) and
u(pj:) in (6). Here p* = 0 implies u* = u in (6) and u* = u in turn implies p* = 0 in
(7) if B(u)  1
4
, as assumed in the proposition. Therefore, p* = 0 and u* = u is an
equilibrium. Because p* = 0, the probability of redistribution P* = 0, and the level
of clientelism C* = 1 P* = 1. This is the ‘traditional clientelism’ equilibrium. The
assumption B(u)\ 1
4
thus ensures the existence of the traditional clientelism
equilibrium.
By the same argument, p* = 1 and u* = u are an equilibrium when B(u)ø 1
6
.
Then, the probability of redistribution P* = 1, and the level of clientelism
C* = 1 P* = 0. This is the ‘no clientelism’ equilibrium.
Finally, p* = 1 a is consistent with any value of u between u and u, and
u* = 1
4g(yy) 1 (which makes B(u
*)= 1
4
) is consistent with any value of p between 0
and 1
2
. The two conditions can hold simultaneously if a. 1
2
(so that p* = 1 a\ 1
2
)
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and B(u)\ 1
4
\B(u) (so that B(u*)= 1
4
is feasible). In this equilibrium P* = 1 a,
and C* =a. This is the ‘modern clientelism’ equilibrium.
2. To derive the level of transfers given by the patron in the different equili-
bria, note the following. The ‘traditional clientelism’ equilibrium features
P* = 0 and therefore corresponds to the ‘full clientelism’ regime in (4). The
transfers that apply are B(u)
1ps. Once we set the equilibrium values and the
assumption that s= 1
2
, this simplifies to T * = 2B(u).
The transfers in the ‘modern clientelism’ equilibrium are those applying in the
interior regime in (4). After setting s= 1
2
, and B(u)= 1
4
they equal T * = 1
2
.
The fact that transfers in the traditional clientelism equilibrium are lower than
in the modern one follows directly from comparing 2B(u) and 1
2
. This holds as long
as B(u)\ 1
4
, which is the assumption that ensures the existence of the ‘traditional
equilibrium.’
The difference between the transfers in the two regimes can be decomposed into
two positive parts, where the subscripts M and T refer to the modern and the tradi-























This expression decomposes the difference in equilibrium transfers into a part
owing to differences in inequality delegitimation u* and differences in the func-
tional form linking inequality delegitimation to the patron choice of transfers: in
the traditional clientelism equilibrium, the transfer choice is one of the corner solu-
tions, whereas in the modern clientelism equilibrium, it is an interior solution.
The first part is positive because B(u*M )=
1
4
.u*T =B(u) from the assumption
ensuring the existence of the ‘traditional equilibrium.’ This assumption also implies
that the second part is positive. h
Proof. In each generation t, citizens start with given pt and ut and decide their
transmission of delegitimation zt. After the patron has chosen Tt and the idiosyn-
cratic efficacy shock eit has been realized, they compare the value of VR and VC to
decide whether to engage in clientelism or support the redistributive platform. This
decision leads to the actual probability of redistribution Pt.
Comparing expressions (1) and (2) from the static model, with the appropriate
time subindices, gives a critical value of efficacy above which people support redis-
tribution. This critical value is the same as in the static model, with appropriate
time subindices: p̂t(pt, ut, Ttj:)[ 1 B(ut)Tt , where B(ut)[ g(y y)(1+ ut).
The probability of redistribution Pt(pt, ut, Tt), given pt, ut, and Tt, is then also as
in the static model in (3), again with appropriate time subindices.
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The patron decision of Tt is also the same as in the static model, and given by
(4), again with appropriate time subindices.
Therefore, the probability of redistribution accounting for the patron choice
Pt(pt, utj:) is also as in the static model, given by (5).
According to the assumptions of the dynamic model, benchmark efficacy of gen-
eration t + 1 equals the actual probability of redistribution at time t: pt + 1 =Pt. As
Pt(pt, utj:) depends on benchmark efficacy in generation t, pt, this equality leads to
an equation in differences governing the dynamics of pt, given ut. Therefore, repla-
cing P for pt + 1, and adding the corresponding time subindices in (5) yields
pt + 1(pt, utj:)=
0 if pt  p0(ut)
1
2s








where p0(ut) and p1(ut) are given in the proof of Proposition 1.
For given ut, dynamics are explosive if
dpt+ 1
dpt
.1, and this occurs when s\ 1
2
.
We now consider the choice of zt and the consequent determination of ut + 1.
Parents choose zt to maximize (9). Taking the first-order condition of this expres-
sion yields the choice of zt as a function of delegitimation and efficacy beliefs of
generation t:
zt(ut, ptj:)= ut +(1 h)(y y)(pt  (1 a))
Because delegitimation beliefs of generation t + 1 depend only on zt(ut, ptj:) and
on parameters, plugging the expression for zt expression into expression (8), we
obtain ut + 1(ut, ptj:):
ut+ 1(pt, utj:)=h~u+(1 h)ut +(1 h)2(y y)(pt  (1 a)) ð11Þ
The equations in differences (11) and (10), together with the initial conditions p0
and u0, and the myopic choice Tt (given in (4) with the corresponding time subin-
dices), characterize the dynamics of model: for given p0 and u0, T1 is given by (4),
p1 is given by (10), u1 is given by (11), and so on.
From here onwards, we provide an informal proof of the proposition using a
phase diagram. We start by constructing the schedules that keep p and u constant,
respectively, in the (u, p) space. The one for u (Du= 0) follows directly from sub-
tracting ut from both sides of (11), setting it to zero and solving for pt. We denote
it as pu(ut), with a subscript u, to make clear that it is the level of p that makes u
constant:




y y (ut 
~u) ð12Þ
The schedule for p (Dp= 0) follows from (10), by subtracting pt from pt + 1, and
setting the expressions to zero. This yields
326 Journal of Theoretical Politics 33(3)
Dp= 0 ! pt(ut)=
0 if 0  p0(ut)


















These schedules can be used to construct a phase diagram depicting the
dynamics of the system. It is straightforward to see that the Du= 0 schedule is
increasing in ut, so it slopes upward in the (u, p) space. It is also plain that this
slope is increasing in h. As h goes to zero the schedule becomes flat and when h
goes to one, the schedule becomes vertical. The dynamics are also easy to derive
from (11). If pt is higher than pu(ut), ut increases, and vice versa. The left panel of
Figure A1 illustrates this.
The Dp= 0 schedule is the same as the schedule for p(u) in the static model,
except that s is allowed to be free. Thus, the schedule has three parts, correspond-
ing to the different patron transfers regimes. The schedule is flat at zero if
p0(ut)  0 (ut is sufficiently low), flat at one if p1(ut)\1 (ut is sufficiently high), and
pint(ut) corresponding to the interior regime otherwise.
Allowing s to be free has implications mainly for the interior regime: in the
static equilibrium, p(u) was vertical, but now the schedule can slope upwards or
downwards, depending on s. It is clear from the expression for Dp= 0 that
pint(ut) is vertical if s=
1
2















Figure A1. Dynamics of pt and of ut.
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It is easy to show that this expression is decreasing in s (except in the disconti-
nuity at s= 1
2
). Moreover, this expression tends to zero when sigma tends towards
infinity. Putting these results together implies that pint(ut) has a negative slope when
s is low, and rotates clockwise as s increases, first becoming vertical at s = 1
2
and
eventually becoming flat when s! ‘.
The dynamics of pt can be easily derived from (10): pt goes directly to zero if
pt  p0(ut) and goes directly to one if pt.p1(ut). Otherwise, dynamics are dictated
by the interior regime in (10). These imply that if ut is higher than pint(ut) (i.e., to
the right in the (u, p) space), pt increases, and vice versa. The right panel of
Figure A1 illustrates this, for s = 0:6.
Putting together the dynamics of ut and those of pt makes it immediately appar-
ent that the dynamics of the system depend on which of the two schedules (pint(ut)
or pu(ut)) has a higher slope at the point where the two lines intercept (the corre-
sponding steady-state value of u and p).
The results in the proposition follow by noting from the discussion before that
pu rotates anti-clockwise from zero to infinity as h goes from zero to one, whereas




flat if s! ‘). Therefore, pu has a steeper slope than pint when s and h are above
some threshold, and vice versa. This discussion, however, does not take into consid-
eration that the slope of pint depends on u, and that the steady-state level of u itself
depends on s. The parameter s affects the slope of pint evaluated at the steady-state
level of u also through its effect on the steady-state level of u. It is difficult to pro-
vide a general proof that, even taking this into consideration, pint still rotates clock-
wise as s increases as mentioned previously. We provide here an informal graphical
illustration of the result, using ‘sensible’ parameter values in Figure A2.11 h
Figure A2. Slope of pint with respect to s evaluated at the interior u steady state.
328 Journal of Theoretical Politics 33(3)
Notes
1. This is a vast literature. For reviews, see Hicken (2011) and Mares and Young (2016).
2. One may consider that the rich patron stands for a rich family with income yR that has
a small associated measure f so that y= y+fy
R
1+f .
3. The i appears as a superscript in order to allow for the subscript t (denoting genera-
tions) in the dynamic extension of the model in the following.
4. We assume that the citizen’s inequality delegitimation choice and the patron transfer
choice is simultaneous for simplicity, because it implies that neither of the two choices
is done foreseeing the consequences of the choice for the other actor
5. The work of Major and Schmader (2001) contrasts two opposing social psychology
theories on the self-esteem implications of delegitimizing inequality. ‘Ego defense per-
spectives’ argue that perceiving social inequalities as unjust can be protective emotion-
ally, as this buffers self-esteem by over-attributing personal bad outcomes to external
factors such as discrimination and injustice. ‘System justification’ theories, in contrast,
argue that consistently believing in an unfair world erodes self-esteem. The argument is
that beliefs in an unjust world erodes the feeling of being socially accepted, or generates
anxiety by decreasing one’s perception of predictability and control over the
environment.
6. With ‘true’ value we mean an objective measure of how much incomes are generated
according to standard conceptions of justice, such as the degree of equality of opportu-
nity or whether incomes are obtained through effort versus connections.
7. The formulation of delegitimation belief as partly chosen and partly given by the real-
ity of their environment does not really play a role in the static model, but it will be rel-
evant in the dynamic extension in the following.
8. The results in the proposition are for the case where s= 1
2
because otherwise corner
solutions make the full characterization of the equilibrium cumbersome. Most deriva-
tions in the proof, however, are done allowing s to be a free parameter. The following
dynamic model also allows s to be a free parameter.
9. As in the static model, all citizens in a given generation make the same choices regard-
ing their children’s delegitimation beliefs and so we drop the superscript i in uit.
10. As for u, all citizens in a given generation make the same choices zt and so we drop the
superscript i.
11. The parameter values are h= 0:6, a= 0:7, g = 0:01, (y y)= 10, and ~u= 0:35.
12. An important exception is Bustikova and Corduneanu-Huci (2017) who focus on trust
as a factor in the decline of clientelism.
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